Abstract. In Pattern Recognition, vol. 36, 2003, Hou proposed a four-share visual cryptography scheme for color images. The scheme splits a secret image into four shares, the black mask and the other three shares. It was claimed that without knowing the black mask, no information about the secret image can be obtained even if all the other three shares are known. In this paper, we show that this may be true for a few specific two-color secret images only. In all other cases however, security cannot be guaranteed. We show that an attacker can compromise a randomly chosen two-color secret image from any two of the other three shares with probability 4/7. The advantage will increase to 6/7 if all the other three shares are known. If the secret image has three or four colors, we show that the attacker can compromise it with probability 4/7 and 8/35, respectively. Finally, we show that our technique can be extended to compromising secret images with more than four colors.
Introduction
Visual Cryptography Scheme (VCS), introduced by Naor and Shamir [1] in 1994, is a type of secret sharing [2] techniques for images. The idea of VCS is to split an image into a collection of random shares (printed on transparencies) which separately reveal no information about the original secret image other than the size of it. The image is composed of black and white pixels, and can be recovered by superimposing a threshold number of shares without any computation involved. Here is an example using a dithered black-and-white Lena image as the original secret image (Fig. 1) .
Fig. 1. Original Secret Image -Dithered
By applying the Naor-Shamir 2-out-of-2 visual cryptography algorithm [1] , two shares (printed on transparencies) are created, which separately reveal no information about the original image. It can only be recovered when both of the shares are obtained and superimposed. Fig. 2 shows the two shares and the superimposition of them. Note that the size of the images is expanded by a factor of 4.
Fig. 2. Two Shares and the Superimposition of the Shares
The technology makes use of the human vision system to perform the OR logical operation on the superimposed pixels of the shares. When the pixels are small enough and packed in high density, the human vision system will average out the colors of surrounding pixels and produce a smoothed mental image in a human's mind. For example, a block of 2 × 2 pixels shown below will be viewed as a gray-like dot as the two black pixels and the two nearby white pixels are averaged out. If we print the 2 × 2 pixel blocks shown in Fig. 3 separately onto two transparencies and superimpose them. This effect is equivalent to performing a pixel-wise OR logical operation on each of the four pairs of pixels between these two transparencies. The result is shown in Fig. 4 . One of the unique and desirable properties of VCS is that the secret recovery process can easily be carried out by superimposing a number of shares (i.e. transparencies) without requiring any computation. Besides black-and-white images, a natural extension of this research problem is to perform secret sharing on color images. In [3] , Hou proposed three VCS for color images. Among them, the first one uses four shares to split a secret image. The four shares are called black mask, C (Cyan) share, M (Magenta) share and Y (Yellow) share. This scheme reproduces the best quality among the three in terms of image contrast during secret image recovery process. It is also the only one supporting a practically useful feature called two-level security control. This feature allows an authority to keep a particular share, the black mask, secret and release the other three shares to the public, without worrying about exposing the concealed image. In particular, the author claimed that this scheme is secure as long as the black mask is kept secret. There would have no information leaked even if all the other three shares, namely C, M, Y shares, are exposed regardless of the color composition of the original secret image.
Our Results. We conduct a security analysis on Hou's VCS scheme with respect to the two-level security control feature. We find that the security of the scheme depends crucially on the color composition of the original secret image. We show that this scheme may support two-level security control only if the original secret image contains only two colors chosen from a specific set of colors we identified in this paper. If the original secret image contains any other colors, we find that an adversary will have a high chance of compromising the scheme. We propose an attacking technique and show that by applying this technique to Hou's VCS scheme, an adversary will be able to recover the original secret image with high probability in the following scenarios.
-Two-Color Case 1. If the original secret image has two colors and any two of the C, M, Y shares are obtained, the adversary will be able to recover the original image with probability 4/7. -Two-Color Case 2. If the original secret image has two colors and all three of the C, M, Y shares are obtained, the adversary will be able to recover the original image with probability 6/7. -Three-Color Case. If the original secret image has three colors and all three of the C, M, Y shares are obtained, the adversary will be able to recover the original image with probability 4/7. -Four-Color Case. If the original secret image has four colors and all three of the C, M, Y shares are obtained, the adversary will be able to recover the original image with probability 8/35.
In all the scenarios above, the probabilities are taken under the random choices of the colors in the original secret images. By recovering a secret image, we require that the adversary should at least be able to determine the shape or pattern of the original secret image, that is, being able to determine the boundary between two distinct color regions in the image. We also show that our attacking technique can be extended to compromise images with more than four colors 1 . It is noted that in any of the attacks, nothing about the black mask is needed to know by the adversary. This implies that the two-level security control cannot be guaranteed.
Paper Organization. In Sec. 2, we review Hou's VCS. In Sec. 3, we formalize the scheme using matrix representation, then describe our attacks for the four scenarios above, and lastly discuss how to extend the attacking technique to scenarios where the original secret image has more than four colors. We conclude the paper in Sec. 4.
2 Review of Hou's Four-Share VCS
Preliminary -Dithering
Dithering is a technique used to create an illusion of color depth in images with limited color palette. The technique has been used commonly on printing applications. In a dithered image, colors not available in the palette are approximated by a diffusion of colored pixels from within the available palette. The human eye perceives the diffusion as a mixture of colors within it. The basic principle of the diffusion is to pack pixels in higher density for representing darker colors and distribute the pixels sparsely for representing lighter colors. Fig. 6 shows a 2-level dithered ramp after applying the Floyd-Steinberg dithering algorithm [4] . In the dithered image, the black dots are sparser in brighter parts and are denser in darker parts. 
Hou's VCS Scheme
In [3] , Hou proposed three VCS for color images. Among them, there is one which produces four shares, namely black mask, C share, M share and Y share. Comparing with the other two schemes, this scheme yields the best image contrast during secret recovery which involves the superimposition of the four shares. In addition, this scheme is the only one which is claimed to support a practically useful feature called two-level security control. In the following, we review this scheme and illustrate it using an example where the original secret image is a 24-bit color Lena image shown in Fig. 7 . Step 1. The scheme first decomposes the original image into three primitive-color images under the subtractive model, namely, C (Cyan), M (Magenta) and Y (Yellow). Fig. 8 shows the three primitive color components of the Lena image, where each image has 256 levels of the corresponding primitive color.
Step 2. After decomposition, each primitive-color image is dithered (e.g. by applying the FloydSteinberg algorithm [4] ) so that each image will have two color levels, namely the presence of the Step 3. A black mask with double size of width and height of the original secret image is randomly generated. It contains the same number of pixel blocks as the number of pixels in the original secret image. Each block consists of four pixels which are aligned as a 2 × 2 square box with two black pixels and two 'transparent' pixels (when printed on a transparency). Since the black mask is randomly generated, for each pixel block, there are six possible patterns where Fig. 3 shows two of them.
Step 4. In this step, three other shares, namely C, M and Y shares are generated. To generate these shares, the dithered C, M and Y primitive-color images of the original secret image (e.g. Fig. 9 ) are read in pixel by pixel. As mentioned (in Step 2 above), each pixel in a dithered primitive-color image is now having only 1-bit color depth. If the value of the input pixel from a dithered primitive-color image is 1, that is, the pixel contains the primitive color, a pixel block in the corresponding primitive-color share will be produced. The pixel block produced will have the same pattern as the corresponding pixel block in the black mask. For example, if the pixel at the upper left hand corner of the dithered C image of the original secret image is 1 and if the upper left hand 2 × 2 pixel block of the black mask is shown in Fig. 10 , then the output pixel block shown at the upper left hand corner of the C share will have the same pattern as that in the black mask, as shown in Fig. 11 .
On the other side, if the value of the pixel in the original dithered C image is 0, then the output pixel block of the C share will have the complement pattern of that in the black mask, that is shown in Fig. 12 . Fig. 15 illustrates the superimposition of these four shares. Similar to the Naor-Shamir visual cryptographic scheme for black-and-white images [1] , the image size is expanded by a factor of 4. 
Two-Level Security Control
In this VCS, the purpose of the black mask is to cover up the 'disguising' but unwanted colors during the secret recovery process. Without possessing the black mask, it was believed in [3] that the 'disguising' colors could jumble with the actual colors of the original secret image and therefore could ensure the security of the original image. It was also claimed that without the black mask, the original image could remain secret even if all the three shares, i.e. C, M , Y shares, are known to an adversary.
In [3] , this property is termed two-level security control and a practical application is given. For example, as long as a manager of a company keeps the black mask and gives the C, M , Y shares to his subordinates, the content of the image will remain confidential, even though all his subordinates collude. This could refer to the first security level control. The second level is that once the black mask is known, useful information about the original secret image could be revealed even if not all the C, M , Y shares are known. For example, Fig. 16 shows that useful information about the original Lena image is readily revealed by superimposing only the black mask and the C share.
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the VCS reviewed in Sec. 2. We start off by formalizing the scheme using a matrix representation. As explained in Step 2 of the scheme (Sec. 2.2), after dithering, -C (C,M,Y ) is the set of all possible Boolean matrices which correspond to a pixel in the original dithered secret image with color value (C, M, Y ). According to Fact 1 above, we can see that
, then a Boolean matrix generated from any column permutation of
. This property is called closed. This can easily be shown by the method of contradiction and therefore is skipped here. Readers may refer to [1] for related details. Note that in any of the Boolean matrices for the VCS (Sec. 2.2), any two rows are either having identical pattern or complemental pattern. In general, a secret sharing scheme should be secure regardless of the structure of the original secret, provided that the secret falls in the secret space of the scheme. When applied to the VCS reviewed in Sec. 2.2, we require that the security of the original secret image should not rely on the color composition (i.e. the number of colors) or pattern of it. If an adversary is able to determine at least the shape of the original secret image, that is, being able to determine the boundary between any two distinct color regions, from C, M , Y shares without knowing the black mask, then we consider the scheme to be insecure. This definition of security is commonly adopted and practically important because in practice, one can readily determine useful information of the original secret image if the shape of the image is revealed. For example, if the original image contains a well-recognizable logo or letters of some language alphabet.
In the following four subsections, we will evaluate four attacking scenarios as mentioned in Sec. 1. The attacking scenarios explore the differences on the color composition of the original dithered secret image and the number of shares that the adversary has obtained among the C, M , Y shares. In any of the attacks, the black mask is not known to the adversary, and therefore, they satisfy the two-level security control assumption. By referring to the application of two-level security control suggested in [3] , all the attacking scenarios are related to collusion among a manager's subordinates who possess the C, M , Y shares, but not the black mask.
Two-Color Case 1
Below are the assumptions for this case.
-The original dithered secret image has two colors.
-Adversary A has obtained any two of the C, M , Y shares.
We will show with high probability that A is able to recover the shape of the original secret image. For all the probability evaluations below, they are taken under the random choices of the colors of the original dithered secret images. Without loss of generality, suppose the two shares obtained by A are C and M shares. The following attacking technique can also be applied to cases if A has obtained a different pair of shares. Attack 1. After obtaining C and M shares, A superimposes the shares and groups the pixel blocks into two categories: one having identical pattern and the other one having complemental pattern. Then A 'recolors' the superimposed image by filling the pixel blocks in the group of identical pattern with one color and the pixel blocks in the group of complemental pattern with another color. Finally, A checks the result and sees if there is any useful information such as the shape of the original secret image revealed.
Here is an example. Fig. 17 shows the original secret image IM G A which contains two colors, magenta and yellow. Suppose A has obtained the C and M shares (Fig. 18) . When the two shares . When cyan and magenta are superimposed, the resulting color shown is blue (please check the call-out image in Fig. 19 ). The region of complemental pattern is the exterior of the circle. Since the color of the original secret image is magenta. According to the Magenta matrix basis B (0,1,0) , the C row and the M row in this matrix are having the complemental pattern. Therefore, we can see (in the call-out image) both cyan and magenta in this region. After applying the 'recoloring' described in the paragraph "Attack 1 " above, we can completely recover the shape of the original secret image (Fig. 20) . As there are only 8 possible colors in the original secret image, there are altogether only 56 ways of coloring the two regions and one of them is the original secret image.
Analysis. We now evaluate how likely that A can compromise the scheme in this case. From the two shares obtained by A, as explained above, there are only two possible outcomes when these two shares are superimposed. One outcome corresponds to the identical pattern of the pixel blocks and the other corresponds to the complemental pattern of the pixel blocks at the corresponding position As there are two colors in the original secret image. Suppose that one of these two colors is in G 1 (the group of identical pattern) and the other color is in G 2 (the group of complemental pattern). As we have seen in the example above, since the color display of the superimposed C and M shares for a color from G 1 is different from that for a color from G 2 , it is easy for adversary A to find the boundary between two color regions. Let E be the event that in a two-color original secret image, one color is from G 1 and the other from G 2 . As the cardinality of each of G 1 and G 2 is 4, there are 4 × 4 = 16 possible combinations for event E to happen. If we consider an experiment where the two colors in the original secret image are randomly chosen from the 8 possible colors, we can see that
which is the success probability of A in breaking the scheme in this attacking scenario.
Two-Color Case 2
-Adversary A has obtained all three shares, namely the C, M and Y shares.
When comparing with the assumptions in Two-Color Case 1, A in this case has more information and is more capable. This is because A can simply launch "Attack 1 " (page 10) on any two of the shares it gets and the success chance will at least be equal to that in the Two-Color Case 1, that is, 4/7. In the following attack, we will see that A can do a little bit more to boost its success probability in a significant way.
Attack 2.
A superimposes all three shares and categorizes the superimposed pixel blocks into two groups, where in each group, the pixel blocks are having the same mixture of colors, while between these two groups, they are having different mixture of colors. If such two groups are found, A 'recolors' the superimposed image by filling the two groups separately with two distinct colors. We use the same example as in Sec. 3.1 to illustrate this attack. The original secret image is IM G A (Fig. 17) . The C and M shares have been shown before in Fig. 18 , and the Y share is shown in Fig. 21 . After superimposing C, M , Y shares, we obtain the image shown in Fig. 22 . From the call-out image (1200% zoomed) in Fig. 22 , we can see the two regions clearly. The two groups of different mixture of colors can also be identified easily. After recoloring (Fig. 23) , the shape of the original secret image is recovered.
Analysis. Similar to the analysis in Sec. 3.1, we consider the groups of matrix bases which give distinct colors when C, M and Y shares are superimposed. It can be found that there are four groups, each of the groups gives a distinct mixture of colors when C, M , Y shares are superimposed. Below are the groups. Each group above has a distinct mixture of colors when all the C, M and Y shares are superimposed. We refer to these groups as color mixture groups.
If the two colors of the original secret image come from two different color mixture groups, then the shape of the original secret image will be revealed. If these two colors are chosen randomly from the 8 possible colors, the probability that A breaks the VCS in this attacking scenario will be 1 − is the probability that the two colors belong to the same color mixture groups. 
Three-Color Case
We now investigate the case where the original secret image has three colors. Below is the summary of the assumptions for this case.
-The original dithered secret image has three colors.
Since A gets the same set of shares as in the Two-Color Case 2, if A superimposes all the three shares and categorizes the pixel blocks with respect to the four color mixture groups (Sec. 3.2), A will be able to get up to three groups of color mixtures. By recoloring these identified color mixture groups with distinct colors, the shape of the original secret image could be recovered.
Suppose the original secret image is IM G B (Fig. 24 ) which contains three color stripes. Fig. 25 shows the C, M , Y shares of IM G B . After superimposing the shares, the image obtained is shown in Fig. 26 . We can see clearly from the call-out images (1200% zoomed) the boundary between any two adjacent color regions. Fig. 27 shows the superimposed image after recoloring. Analysis. In order to recover all the three colors of the original secret image, these three colors should fall into three distinct color mixture groups. There are 
Four-Color Case
We now extend our attacking technique to the case where the original secret image has four colors. Below is the summary of the assumptions for this case. The attack is the same as below except that in this case, A may get up to four color mixture groups from the superimposed pixel blocks. Suppose the original secret image is IM G C (Fig. 28) which contains four colors. Fig. 29 shows the C, M , Y shares of IM G C . After superimposing the shares, the image obtained is shown in Fig. 30 . We can see from the call-out images (1200% zoomed) the boundary between any two adjacent color regions. Fig. 31 shows the superimposed image after recoloring.
Analysis. Similar to the analysis in Sec. 3.3, A can recover the original secret image if its four colors fall into four distinct color mixture groups given in Sec. 3.2. Similarly, we can find that the success probability of A in this case is ( 
Remarks
From the attacks above, readers may find that A will not be able to compromise the secret if the original secret image contains only one of the following four color pairs: For each of the color pairs above, if we consider their matrix bases but ignoring the first row, which is corresponding to the black mask, their matrix bases are identical to each other after conducting some column permutation to one of them. This implies that no matter how the C, M , Y shares are superimposed, the superimposed pixel block will consist of the same mixture of colors. Therefore, the VCS reviewed in Sec. 2.2 may be secure if only these color pairs are used. This however, severely limits the effectiveness of the scheme as it may not be used to perform secret sharing for secret images which have three colors or more without worrying about leaking some useful information to colluders who possess the C, M and Y shares.
Attack Extension
From the color mixture groups given in Sec. 3.2, we know that if the original secret image has more than four colors, then there must exist at least two colors in the original secret image that belong to the same color mixture group. However, if the regions of these two colors are not adjacent to each other, attackers may still be able to recover the shape of the original secret image by superimposing the C, M and Y shares. We illustrate this by showing an example below. Fig. 32 shows a 5-color secret image denoted by IM G D and Fig. 33 shows the C, M and Y shares of IM G D . After superimposition, five color regions could be identified (Fig. 34) and they become clear after the recoloring is performed (Fig. 35) . Although the adversary A may not be able to tell if the two diagonal regions painted with cyan in Fig. 35 correspond to two different colors in the original secret image (as A may not know the number of colors in the original image), the shape of the original secret image is completely recovered.
However, if the regions of two colors which belong to the same color mixture group are adjacent to each other, A is not able to find out the boundary between these regions. We illustrate this using the following example. Fig. 37 shows the C, M and Y shares of some secret image. After superimposing them, there are four distinct color regions identified (Fig. 38) . It becomes clear in the recolored image shown in 
Conclusion
In this paper, we provided a detailed security analysis to Hou's four-share VCS [3] which was previously believed to support the two-level security control. We found that by superimposing the shares that an adversary has acquired and applying some recoloring method according to the color mixture groups we identified (Sec. 3.2), the adversary may find out some useful information such as the shape or pattern of the original secret image. We provided some examples to support our findings and evaluated the adversary's success probability under various settings. In particular, the adversary can find out the shape of the original secret image with probability 4/7 if the original secret image has two colors only and the adversary has acquired two of the C, M and Y shares. The winning chance of the adversary increases to 6/7 if the adversary gets all the three shares. If the original secret image has three or four colors, we showed that the adversary will still be able to compromise the secret with winning probability 4/7 and 8/35, respectively. Nothing about the black mask is needed to know by the adversary in any of the attacks. We further discussed the feasibility of our attack against secret images which have more than four colors. We illustrated the case where the adversary will still be able to recover the shape of the secret image entirely and the other case where the adversary may only be able to retrieve partial information of the original secret image.
Our results suggest that the security of the scheme depends critically on the color composition and distribution of the original secret image. If the original secret image is composed of two specific colors given in Sec. 3.5, the scheme may be secure. Otherwise, the scheme is highly susceptible to attacks which can effectively compromise the scheme in various scenarios. 
